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I. An Alternative Introduction 
In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), product 
liability cases are brought before the special chamber of 
the Federal High Court (Bundesgerichtshof BGH), with 
jurisdiction for product liability cases. Judges sitting 
in this court have in addition to their vocation already 
earned themselves a reputation in legal writing. Yet even 
these judges get into difficulties when they have to 
decide whether the producer has complied with necessary 
technical precautions in protecting the user from injury. 
This requires a degree of outside assistance which is to 
be found in technical standards. Infact there are several 
thousand of them, and judges find it hard to know whether 
they actually reflect the present state of art, or have 
since become obsolete; whether perhaps they will be 
contested by technical experts or consumers. Thus, a 
Federal High Court judge has to keep informal methods 
close at hand and does not rely exclusively on expert 
advice. By simply picking up the phone, the judge is in 
contact with the person responsible for employment 
protection at the Federal Public Prosecutor 's Office. In 
product liability circles people know each other, and 
their reputations. Informal conversation determines the 
bounds of arguments made in a given case and the judge 
will obtain all the background information necessary to 
the procedural process, on an informal basis, which 
appears in the written judgment, if at all, in coded form. 
My point here is not to claim that such conversations are 
unprofessional. The small, but everyday affairs can 
illustrate much rnore about the role technical standards 
play (or can play) in practice, where they supposedly play 
no role. It therefore becomes all the more important to 
find procedures which guarantee third party (in our case 
consumer) influence in the development of technical 
standards 9iving consumers a formal guarantee of 
participation in standard-setting procedure, whose 
standpoint could then take effect directly through the 
producer - likewise participation in post-market control. 
The terms 'procedure' and 'participation' are couched in 
the sense used in the debate on the ~ole of the consumer 
in product safety law. This refers to the inclusion of 
the consumer in the standardisation process, in post-
rnarket control, as a person with no direct interest, but 
who represents the public interest. As can be seen then, 
we are not dealing with legal redress, but the right to be 
heard. 
t:age 1B3 
My starting point is that consumer 1~%rticipation is deficient at both levels of regulation. I would go 
further in stating that existing fundamental principles of 
EC law, provide basic elernents for the development of- a 
procedural right to participation, which should be founded 
as an extension of the right to safety. In the lang term, 
any such EC-based procedural right needs to be founded on 
consumer participation i~ 1 7he processes of standardisation and post-rnarket control. 
My considerations for this stern from two diverse sources: 
firstly, from a debate concerning the constitutional 
grounding of the participation of environmental 
organisations, or third parties, in cases where the safety 
or environmental impact of indyf~rial plants is considered 
in the approval procedure;• alternatively, frorn a 
typically German perspective, where procedural rights are 
comprehended as complementary to basic constitutio~~~ 
rights, and not as an integral part of the democracy. 
Here, I intend to put safety law and industrial sites 
planning law on an equal footing. This approach may seem 
surprising, in view of the different ~25spectives, 
procedural regulation and product regulation , given 
the multifaceted developments or risk-based arguments, and 
116. The state of consumer participation in 
standardisation and decision-making over post-sale 
control is described in the expanded German script. 
117. My considerations are based largely on a study 
written for the European Commission, Die Sicherheit 
von Konsumgütern und die Entwicklung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Ch. Joerges/ J. Falke/ 
H-~. Micklitz/ Gert Brüggemeier; Baden-Baden Nomos 
1988. 
118. For a comparison between safety policy in factory 
planning law and product safety, see 
Sicherheitsregulierung und EG :ntegration, 
Brüggemeier/ Falke/ Holch-Treu/ ~oerges/ ~icklitz, 
ZERP DP 3/84 p. 23 et seq. 
119. Neumann in Demokratischer und Autori~ärer Staat, 
1957 p. 20 et seq. 
120. For this distinctiJn and its meaning for product 
safety :aw, Brüggemeier et al. Jp cit. FN 118 p. 23 
et seq. 
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clearly requires an explanation. 121 In industrial sites 
planning law, participation in the administrative 
decision-rnaking process and participa!~9n in the standard-
setting process are distinguished. The processes of 
development of technical standards are identical in 
principle; in both areas of law, problems of access to 
jurisdiction and participation resemble each ot~23 
throughout and can be discussed alongside each other. 
By contrast, it seems that participation in the approval 
procedure for the construction of a site of potential 
<langer to the environment can hardly be compared with the 
possibility of consumer participation in post-market 
control procedure. This is because, in industrial sites 
planning law, the <langer to the environrnent originates in 
the plant itself, the consumer cannot avoid exposure to 
<langer. In product law on the other hand the situation is 
quite different. In this case, the consumer seems to 
irnperil himself, since he makes a decision to purchase a 
product. He exposes himself to risks 12~hich first appear through the marketing of a product. It is therefore a 
121. In this respect see E. Gurlitt, Die 
Verwaltungsöffentlichkeit im Umweltrecht 1989, p. 
131 et seq., who tries to found a similar 
interpretation for the admissibility of product law 
(for medicine and chemicals). 
122. Also G. Winter, Die Angst des Richters bei der 
Technikbewertung, ZRP 1987, p. 247. 
123. Besides, there are limits: it is precisely the 
reticence of Gerrnan administrative courts to 
develop procdural rules for the calculation of 
technical standards which supports the 
administrative checking systems, cf. Winter op cit. 
FN 122 p. 427, mit Nwen aus der Rechtsprechung und 
der Literatur. There is no approval procedure. 
This is very different from prod-_ict safety law. 
This may help to explain why civil courts have far 
fewer diff iculties than administrative courts :n 
laying down the meaning of control in relation to 
technical standards. 
124. Such an approach is supported by the attempts of 
Laubinger, GrundrechtsstruKtur durch Gestaltung des 
Verwaltungsverfahrens, in VerwArch 73 (1982) p. 76, 
who likes to differentiate between "the gravity of 
the action, the probability of injuring a person's 
rights and ~he degree of legality cf the action 
according tot te nature of the gocd." 
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valid exercise to call to mind the fundamental basis of 
procedual participation. In industrial sites planning 
law, this ought to make it possible for the individual to 
effectively defend his constitutionally prot~cted rights, 
for example, life and health. In industrial sites 
planning law, the public duty of protection is based on 
the principle that the 1 ~~ate takes on a joint 
responsibility for risks. There is nothing more to 
product safety law in this sense. In so far as the 
marketing of a product is coupled to statutory approval, 
the public duty is obvious. Technical consumer goods, 
however, are not submitted for statutory approval; in this 
case, however, the state has the task of guaranteeing 
protection of the individual through an effective post-
market control system. Thus far, the post-market control 
procedure is functionally equivalent to an adrninistratl~5 
decision for the approval of an industrial site. 
Despite these arguments, the objection remains that, in 
product safety law, the consumer exposes himself to the 
risk of damage to health through his choice of purchase. 
The acceptance of such risk would only be conceivable 
where a consumer makes a decision knowing of the risks 
involved. In reality, the consumer has no choice and no 
possibility of making an informed decision. The decision 
is taken away from him by standardisation organisations, 
who define the level of safety required. The consumer 
himself is symbol-orientated. Seen in this light, it 
appears possible to make generalisations on the 
constitutional debate concerning procedurally guaranteed 
participation. Intellectually speaking, we can refer to 
Article 2(2) Basic Law (Grundgesetz GG), guaranteeing the 
right to life and procedural protection through the legal 
opinion of the German Constitutional Court 
125. See II! 2 with reference to the Mülheim-Kärlich 
decision, BVerGe 53, p. 30 et seq. 
126. This begs =he question whe=he:, in relation to ~he 
formulation of oost-sale cont:cl, ccnsumers st:ou:i.d 
be granted a ;riori legal protection simply be 
exerc:s:~g their right to a hearing for 
~onpariso~ with the CSA see Joerges et al., cp cit. 
fN 1:;_; ,:. 230 et seq .. 
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(Bundesverfassungsgericht BVGJ. 127 
II. The Right to Safety 
1. Statement of aims 
Since President Kennedy's message to consumers in 1962, 128 
the right to safety has been neatly dovetailed into the 
mainstream of consumer policy objectives. The European 
Community has likewise demanded, 
"an effective protection from dange:::s in the 
interests of health and safety of consumers", 129 in its two consumer policy Programmes of 1976 and 1981. 
A long-awaited third consumer policy Programme has still 
to appear. 'The New Impetus for Consumer Protection 
Policy' 1985, however, lays down Cornmunity objectives for 
a safety policy. The policy of cornpletion of the internal 
market has to be achieved th1~ijgh a general safety duty 
valid throughout the Cornmunit~ 31 In a Communiction to the Council, 8th May 1987 , entitled 'The Safety of 
Consumers' - which t~~ Council acknowledged and approved 
on 25th June 1987 - the first conceptions towards a 
general product safety duty are developed. Programmes, 
impetus and communictions are not legally binding, 
although their precise legal effect is open to 
127. Winter, op cit. FN 122 p. 427; BVerGe 53, 30 (65), 
see esp .• the far-reaching staternent of aims of OVG 
Lüneburg, NVwz 1985, 357 (Buschaus) as well as 
Judges Simon and Häusler in the Soecial Chamber cf 
the BVerGe 53 p. 30 et seq. (MÜlhelm-t<ärlich) 77. 
128. Reprinted by Ev. Hippel, Verbraucherschutz 3. 
Auflage 1986 p. 281 et seq. 
129. Details from N. Reich, Förderung und Schutz, 
diffuser Interessen durch die Europäischer 
Gemeinschaften, Baden-Baden :~87, ~z 68 p.160 
130. 23 July 1985 COM(85) 314 final, apprcved by Council 
26 March 1986 OJ C 167 5 July 1986 
131. COM(87) 209 final 
132. OJ C 176 4 July 1987 
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question. 133 No-one would 
function of the programmes and 
support to the case argued. 
2. Primary Community law 
dispute every 
formulations 
collateral 
which lend 
'The basic right of the Community consumer to health and 
safety' may be deduced through the decisions of the 
European Co~rt of Justice (ECJ), based on the relationship 
between Articles 30 and 36, and the principle 1 ~~ proportionality. This was first conceived by N. Reich. 
Such a basic right might be understood as an 'imnanent 
barrier 1 3~ Community action in the sphere if integration policy'. Infact, the ECJ is trying to maintain the 
compatability of the objective of free movement of goods 
with the duty of Member States to protect its citizens 
from dangerous goods. rhe method of the ECJ is similar 1 3~ 
that of the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVG).~ 
It extends the effect of Article 30, 'measures having 
equivalent effect' - equally the laws of Member States 
governing social protection tend to be regarded as 
barriers to trade. Alongside the extension of the field 
of application, howewer, the ECJ broadens the conceivable 
legal justifications. The ECJ is developing a right to 
safety as a defense for Member States against the 
predominantly internal market aims of the Commisson. 
Article lOO(a) (iv) employs, such a conception, at least 
indirectly. Within the limits of applicability of Article 
100 (a), para. 1, Member States are empowered to reject 
harmonisation rules which are entirely based on internal 
market considerations, thereby denying Member State 
133. See Mertens AG 1982, 29 et seq., the legal validity 
of the international code of conduct was vehemently 
disputed, Horn (ed.) Legal Problems of Codes of 
Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, vo:. 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law, Kluwer 1980; 
recently the teaching of the sources of law has 
grown in importance, see Pflug, Status und Kontrakt 
im Recht der AGB, 1986, as to the :ecal validity of 
the AGB. . 
134. op cit., FN 129, RZ 120 p. 227-229 
135. op cit., FN 129, RZ 175 p. 3C: 
136. In this respect, Denninger, Ver~ass~~gsgerichtliche 
Schlüsselbegriffe in Festschrift, R. Wassermann 
:985, p. 269 et seq. 
responsibility in !j7ety matters, through a 
safeguard procedure. 
special 
The problem of developing a basic right to safety as a 
defensive right lies in its coupling to the objective of a 
uniform internal market. Such an approach complies with 
the logic of the development of the relationship between 
the movement of goods and product safety. It is confirmed 
by the readiness of the Commission to understand the 
harmonisation of product safety as a matter of Community 
concern, since a further division of the market is 
foreseeable as a result of divergent national post-market 
control decisions. This approach, however, limits ths 
conception of the right to safety. This can never become 
more than a right annexed to Article 30, and is always 
faced with the threat of being 'crushed' by the wheels of 
the internal market machinery. 
A starting point for a fundamentally different 
understanding of the right to safety, independent of the 
internal market approach, could be taken through Article 
130 (r) paragraph 1. Article 130 (r) assimilates 
environmental protection to the inventory of objectives of 
primary Community law, a privilege - as it is well known -
which is denied to consumer protection. Yet before we 
turn to the content of Article 130 (r) para. 1, it is 
necessary to enquire into the meaning of consupj8 
protection pursuant to the Single European Act (SEA). 
The latter only appears in Article 100 (a) para. 3, and is 
also subordinated to the aims of internal market policy. 
In order to deduce a right to safety independent of the 
internal market, Article 100 (a) para. 3 therefore offers 
no foothold, chiefly because it addresses only the 
~o~is~ion.and this could1§9obably not be submitted to the JUr1sd1cat1on of the ECJ. 
It is worth mentioning that Article 100 (r) para. l 
extends into environment issues, since a detailed 
definition of protection of health is presented as an aim 
137. Also Reich, op cit. FN 129, az 176 p. 301 
138. See esp. the position of the European Consumer Law 
Group, Consumer Protection in the SEC after the 
Ratification of the Single Act, in JCP vol. 10 No. 
3 (Sept. 1987), p. 319 et seq., mainly written by 
Reich. 
139. Reich, op cit. FN 129, RZ 176 p. 297 et seq. 
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of environmental policy. Theoretically, the right to 
safety could be incorporated into health protection, and 
accordingly be brought under the expansive and protective 
win~ 4Bf environmental law as a constitutional right of the EC. The problems of coordination between Articles 130 
(r), 100 (a) and i!20 have triggered off discussions on 
their interrelation. One could alrnost say that there 
is some agreement to subordinate internal market 
orientated health regulations, Articles 100 and 100 (a) 
respectively, and only comprehend such regulations within 
the framework of Ari!5le 130 which pursues genuine health 
policy objectives. For our purposes, the distinction 
is like the opposition of chalk and cheese. Admittedly, 
it is realistic, but it destroys the chance of giving new 
meaning to a concept of health without it being merely 
annexed to the movement of goods. And this is prec:sly 
the point. To date, the conception of product safety, and 
equally that of a right to safety, focus on possible :isks 
which result from the circulation of goods. Both neg:ect 
the conditions of production and remova: of :hese 
products. A change in approach is required, eq~ally 
'infecting' pr~~~ct safety law with environmental law 
considerations. Statements are to be found in D-G XI 
preparatory work on a directive product safety in which 
140. Also N.C.D. Ehlermann, The Internal Market 
Following the Single European Act, CMLR 1987, pp. 
361 382 et seq., who want to see environmental 
protection regulation limited to procedural 
regulation. This however, once again heightens the 
disparity between factory planning law and product 
law which we believed we had a:ready overccme in 
our arguments, above III. 
141. For an overview, see Joerges e: al., op cit. FN 117 
pp. 374-375; Krämer, The Single European Act and 
Environmental Protection: Reflect:ons on Several 
New Provisions in Corr~unity Law, C~~R 1987 659 et 
seq.; Reich, Schutzpolitik in der E'-lropäischen 
Gemeinschaft im Spannungsfeld von Sch'.J.:znorme~ und 
institutioneller Integration, Schr~E:e~reihe der 
juristischen Studiengesellschaft, Ha~nove:, Heft 
17, 1988. 
142. In this respec:, Krämer, op ci:. FN :41; Reic~ cp 
c i t . , FN 141. 
143. See Winter, Perspektiven des C::iwel:rech:s, ::>VB 
1988, p. 659 ec: seq. 
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waste should be considered as a problem of regulation. 144 
Article 130 ( s) should become the key to understanding 
safety policy and safety law in terms of environmental 
policy and environmental law. For this to be the case, 
however, one still needs a dogmatically conceived legal 
understanding of the interrelationship between the 
provisions. 
3. Seconöary Community law. 
The Directive on product liability completes the safety 
policy conceptions of the New Approach. lt is not 
incidental that the approval of the directive and 
adoption of the New Approach come together in the Council 
at the same time. The safety policy programme of the 
Community, 'credo', was timed to run from the middle of 
1985 in the following way: post-market control falls to 
Member States, the EC limits itself to the organisation of 
exchange of information and the coordination of regulatory 
actions; the directive on product liability aapplies 
indirect pressure on the rnanufacturer to produce safe 
products only and protects the integrity interests of the 
Community consurner. I do not believe that the policy of 
the time was already directed 'towards the creation of a 
right to safe products for all consurners' by simply using 
the notion <cll s 'defecti ve products' in the di recti ve as a 
common basis. The unilateral alignment of cornpensation 
for damages, as well as its incorpcration into the safety 
policy of the New Approach weighs against that idea. The 
gaps in safety policy can only be closed by a separate 
directive, which irnposes a duty on thI 4groducer to bring only safe products into circulation. In the meantime, 
a first proposal has been developed which will soon be 
published in the Official Journal. The chances of the 
project being achieved is quite another question. Only, 
it has become clear that the safety policy conception in 
144. Ch. Joerges and the author are mernbers of a 
formally constituted working comrnittee of :JG XI. 
145. But see Reich op cit. FN 129, RZ 120 p. 228 
146. In this respect, Joerges et al., op cit. FN 117 p. 
447 et seq. See Cornmunications(89) 162-SYN 192, 
Vorschlag für die Richtlinie des Rates zur 
Ausgleichung der Rechts- Ver;.;al.tungsvorschriften 
der Mitgliedstaaten über die allgemeine 
Produktsicherheit. 
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, 47 
the New Approach needs to be supplementea.· This is 
central to our hypothesis because a definitive basis of 
the right to safety is linked to the adoption of a special 
directive on product safety. 
III. The Right to be Heara148 
Both Senates of the Consitutional Court have derived a 
duty to observe procedural formalities, based of Article 2 
para. 2 of the Basic Law (GG), which excludes, as far 1~9 possible, injury to the party protected by the Law. 
Underlying this is the idea that the State must honour its 
protection duties by providing procedural guarantees. lt 
seems to me that the essentially German idea of procedura: 
rights flowing from basic rights, still has a role to play 
despite all reservations about transferr:ng the German 
model to the creation of a Community right to procedural 
participation. This is bfgause, according to 
'productivist concepts of the EC', integration is to 1~f 
achieved through the concept of negative integration. 
The political impetus of Member States has not sufficed 
for tg2 formulation of democratic rights in Trea:y and the 
SEA. For this reason, the democratisation of the 
movement of goods must be deduced as a necessary 
consequence of of productivist concepts. 
1. Statement of aims 
147. This is a further opinion expressed :n our book, 
Joerges et al., FN 117 p. 431 et seq. 
148. By way of clarification: we are not concerned with 
legal redress of citizens/ consurner organisations 
in this context. 
149. BVerGe 53 p. 31 et seq. (55 et seq.) (minori:y 
vote). 
150. Reich, op cit. FN 129, also Th. 3ourgoignie/ D. 
Trubek, Consumer :.aw, Common Markets a:i.d ?ederalism 
in Europe and the USA, 1987, p. 99 et seq. 
151. Reich treats the shortcomings of tiis concept in 
relation to consumer and environmenta: orotec:ion, 
op cit. FN 129. -
152. Alternatively, the EP draft, refece~ces in Reicr., 
op cit., FN 129 p. 26 ?N 19 
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'The right to be heard' lies at the heart of consumer 
policy, as does the right to safety. It is different to 
the right to safety, however, in that it has never been 
concretized in legal terms. Its expression15 ~n the 
consumer programme has remained purely placatory. The 
programmes insist on participation in relevant political 
decision-making processes. This may lie in the 
concentration of consumer policies on the enforcement of 
substantive rights. The interventionist approach to 
consumer law, however, has come to a halt. The prevalent 
policy of incentives and cooperation in itself should 
allow room f~5 4 the development of a policy on consumer participation, yet hitherto it has not corne to this. 
2. Primary Conununity law 
Renewed statements on procedural developments can be found 
in the decisions of the ECJ based on Article 30. This 
grants the consumer the right to choose and freedom of 
choice w±5g respect to his need for satisfaction for his 
products. The acknowledgment of such a right, first 
and foremost, brings a change in perspectives: consumers 
are not only indirectly affected by the free movement of 
goods, they are consignees and consignees have 'rights'; 
consumers can only choose when they have alternatives and 
when they are informed about the possible alternatives. 
Alternatives create obligaticns, that means retaining15g 
competitive market and not restricting the consumer; 
information about alternatives signif ies making demands on 
the producer or possibly the 'State', which are aimed at 
the consumer receiving help in finding his way about the 
market. In the broadest sense, a process for the 
dessemination of information must be founded. The right 
to a market-informed decision not only offers the consumer 
153. See the second Community consumer programrne, 
Bulletin EC 4/79 18 et seq. 
154. As far as can be seen, the BEUC has likewise not 
systematicaily grasped the concept of consumer 
participation at various levels. for an overview 
see Krämer, EWG - Verbraucherrecht, 1986, RZ 46 et 
sec. 
155. Thfs is emphasised by Reich, cp cit. F~ :29, RZ 14 
p. 52, citing Steindorff ZHR 148 ( 1984) 338 and 
Donner SEW 1982, 362 et sea. 
156. Here Reich has in mind :he -paral:el imports urged 
by the Conunission, :ip cit. FN 129, RZ 120 p. 228. 
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the opportunity for active participation, it also burdens 
him with the responsibility of participation, or of mere 
passivity. In this sense, Article 30 engenders a right to 
participation or a right for participa~§,, from whibh 
concrete requiremen~s can be developed. Thus it 
follows: (1) Article 30 is not only aimed at Member 
States and producers, rather it provides the consumer with 
a legally guranteed position in relation to the movement 
of goods, and, (2), a roie which the consumer can only 
fill if producer and Member State take the necessary 
procedural precaucions. To this end, the decisions of the 
ECJ based on Article 30, show tendencies comparable to 
those in Constitutional Court decisions, setting aside a 
procedure for the basic rights flowing from Article 30 and 
guaranteeing the exerci~s of those basic rights. Since 
the Cattenom decision, it should have become clear that 
ECJ considers formal competence to be a minimal 
requirement for procedural rights. 
3. Secondary Community law 
The prospects for a concretisation of procedural 
participation seems to be out of the quescion. In recent 
years, the Commission has certainly laid the foundation 
stones for environmental law and consumer law. In spite 
of a dearth of regulation, one can easily identify the 
Impetus of EC policy: procedural participaticn in post-
market control, the administrative approval procedure 
respectively only comes into question at national level. 
Procedural participation in European standardisation takes 
place, however, not only at national level but notably 
also at Commuity leve:. 
Thus, Article 4 of the Advertising directive159 contains 
157. I attempted this approach for the right to general 
Community provisions, my interprecation of Article 
30 should allow the consumer eo e:ect his best 
right; H.-w. Micklitz, Der Schuts des Verbrauchers 
vor unlau:eren Allgemeinen Geschäftssbedingungen, 
Typescript 1988. 
158. Decision of the Co~rt, 22 Seprember 1988, Case 
187/87. 
159. Guidelines 84/ 450 EWG :_o Septembe: 1984 on The 
Approximaticn of Laws and Regulations of Membe: 
States cn .'1isleadi:v; Acvertising, OJ :. 250/17 19, 
September 1984. 
procedural stipulations to be followed before national 
authorities or jurisdictions; a parallel prov1s1on is 
planne~60 for the draft directive on unfair contract terrns. It imposes a duty on Member States to take 
appropriate procedural measures without specifying what is 
to be understood by this. Strictly speaking, the 
directives are significant since they oblige Mernber States 
to set rninimum standards for post-rnarket control. 
However, they neglect to lay down any concrete provisions 
concerning the role of the consumer. Consurners rnay be 
entitled to take a joint (class) action as in the FRG, 
thus post-market control itself becomes privatised; 
equally they can be excluded from post-rnarket control only 
if the authorities are present 161 to undertake the 
superv1s1on of pertinent laws. Here again, the 
provisions remain obscure regarding their objectives. The 
fact nevertheless remains that the consumer/third party 
must be included in the procedure. The shift to Conununity 
level offers far lesser prospects. In the EC, consumir5~ 
are not included in the vast majority of committees, 
which in fact pave the way for the formation of the EC's 
own administration, be it in the form of pre or post-
market control. There are no exceptions to the rule that, 
consumers/third parties have no access to proceedings 
negotiated there, nor to information exchanged. A little 
information is given to them, as is the case for the 
general public, in the form of often delayed and 
incomplete reports and comrnittee activities. 
With this in mind, it is amazing to have to acknowledge 
that consurner participation in standardisation at a 
European level was generally thematised and 'regualated', 
even if both documents could not easily be assigned to 
secondary Community law. The agreepg~t of the Commission 
on collaboration with CEN/CENELEC is admittedly, 
formally legitimated by the Council Decision 16th July 
160. DG XI/124/87 EN, Further Draft Articles for 
Discussion on Onfair Contract Terms, June 1987. 
161. Council Guidelines 27 June 1985 on the verification 
of cornpatibility of certain public and private 
projects (85/337/EWG); OJ 175/40, 3 July 1985. 
162. In this context, see Krämer, op cit. FN 15~, RZ 63, 
o page 48 he estirnates tte numbe: of commi~tees to 
be 200. 
163. Printed in DIN-Mitt. 63 (:985), 78 et seq. 
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1984, 164 yet equally it is doubtful whether the Commission 
can conclude legally binding contracts which provide for 
the delegation cf Community165authority to private 
standardisation organisations. Leaving aside legal 
quality/nature, it still remains a fact that, according to 
the agreement, the circles working in that field ought to 
be included, and that the Commission will 'contribute to 
the ascertainment of suitable arrangements according to 
the circumstances'. A right to participation is 
acknowledged, but concrete provisions for the form of 
participation are completely absent. 
The official communication of the 15gmrnission of llth December 1987, is hardly more helpful. It concretises 
general principles. Its legal quality is therefore tied 
to the estimation of its worth. The Commission is urging 
for increased consumer participation at national level to 
ensure that consumer interests are injected into 
CEN/CENELEC in the form of national representation. Just 
how this is to Pr~~ected at a European level =emains open 
to speculation. The Commission wants to 'have a new 
agreement with CEN/CENELEC concerning new working 
techniques'.The Commission is free to take the initiative. 
In accordance with the Council Decision, it has a 
political mandate which it is only carrying out very 
hesitantly. The problems would therefore seem ~ot to lie 
in the lack of will on the part cf Member States - they 
have carried out the formal requirements of the Council 
Decision - but in the engagament of the Corrmission, where 
conceived, and possibly in its own conception, as the 
joint European administrative organ. 
Secondary168community law points towards the existence of 
a right to participation, but leaves its form undisclosed. 
In this analysis we therefore come back to primary 
Comrnunity law to consider the questions which can possibly 
164. Printed in DIN-Mitt. 63 (1984} 681 
165. See also Joerges/ Falke/ Micklitz/ Srüggemeier op 
cit., FN 117 o. 403 
166. COM {87) 617 final 11 December 1987. 
167. There are informal ideas for this, whose actual 
value is difficult :c assess, see Joerges et al., 
FN 11 7 , p . 4 2 7 • 
168. I use the term in oarentiesis, beca~se it is nct 
used in the t radi t lonal sense of Comff'Jr.i tv law, and 
the justification cf ~he ~nterpreta~ion was 
attributed later. 
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be resolved there; whether or not concrete requirements 
can also be deduced on procedural form f rom the 
acknowledgment of the right to participation. 
4. Requirements for the content of procedural 
participation in the standardisation process. 
Again, light may be thrown on the problem with an 
introd~g9ory survey of German constitutional debates. G. 
Winter is of the opinion that the development of 
procedural requirements in the standardisation process is 
for 'mainly terra incognita' in German administrative and 
constitutional law. This opinion holds true as lang as it 
refers to the Mülheim-Kärlich decision of the 
Constitutional Court. In this case, the majority of the 
judges finally decided to leave the decisive quest!9fi 
unresolved and follwed established legal requirements. 
It must also be stated that, at a lower jurisdictional 
level, there are voices which urge for a much more 
tangible procedural form for the standardisati9~1process. Here one could mention the OVG Lüneburg,~ which 
introduced the concept of legitimation through procedural 
requirements, without defining, however, what the term 
really means. The dissenting opinions of judges Simon and 
Heussner are more informative in the Mülheim-Kärlich 
decision of the Constitutional Court, since they refute 
the possibility of deriving 'procedural form by direct 
application of objective fundamental criteria embodied in 
Article 2, para. 2 Basic Law on a case by case basis; on 
the other hand they state the case for a 'higher degree of 
State responsibility .... both in relation to the normat!~2 
form of the procedural right, and for its application. 
They consider the verification of the constitutionality of 
the comrnission responsible f or the development of 
technical norms to be valid, and similarly the 
verification of certain procedural provisions used in the 
drafting of standards. 
It is certainly true that a complete statute containing 
rights and duties for participants cannot be deduced from 
the constitutional right to be heard. At the same time, 
169. op cit., FN 122 p. 427 
170. BVerGe 53, 30 et seq., 66 
171. NVwZ 1985, 357 (Buschhaus) 
172. Dissenting opinion cf BVerGE 53, 71 et seq. (77 and 
78). 
however, one can imagine the development of procedural 
principles to be observed in accordance with the 
constitution and which cannot be undermined by the 
'tricks' of procedural technicalities. Accordingly,· a 
step in this has been taken by the Constitutional Court in 
a key der}jion concerning the procedural rights of asylum-
seekers. Following this decision, both the rights of 
audience of the interested party and the formal decision 
of competence to take jurisdication belang to the central 
body of procedural rights. The limits of the general 
principles of procedural participation, valid for 
technical standards, arise from the function of 
participation in procedure in a democratic society. Its 
most important aspect consists in increaseing public 
awareness, it does not amount to taking over t9~ role of 
spokesman for the economy or government, and can 
neither be brought in a der}3ive context into the realm of 
protection of individuals. 
- The formal shaping of procedure: the content of basic 
rights is empty if the participants have no idea 
whatsoever about what facilities are available to them. 
Thus, it is necessary to define and set forth rights and 
duties in written form. 
Access to information: rules of procedure must endure 
that consumers receive all the informatior. necessary to 
173. BVerGe 56, 216 et seq., 242 et seq., also Gurlitt, 
FN 121, 134 et seg. 
174. This seems now, as was previously the case, to be 
the position adopted by the BVerGe and at least 
partly the OVG, see BVerGe 53 31 et seg. (63 and 
64); also Winter op cit. FN 122, p. 427. The 
criteria developed by courts giving :egal 
protection at administrative hearings are very 
general and basically apply in the forn of 
procedural rights. 
175. In relation to the function of a hearing procedure 
for a democratic poli~y see, once again Gur:i:t, FN 
121, 47 et seq .. In a nutshe:l ~ne could say tha: 
the right to be heard :egi:imates ~he ~utcoffie if 
the decision was based or. ~ublic orocedure. On the 
other har.d, prccedural rigSts nee~ t~ be assa~ed by 
special jurisdicticns, ~f :he ~utco~e hs already 
beer. determined befcre tte procedure begins. 
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make a choice. One must strive for equality17~f information for all the parties involved in procedure. 
Access to allocation and distribution systefus: 
procedural rules must guarantee that the consumer can form 
his own opinions and viewpoints in the distribution 
system. 
Coordination of committees: consumers have a claim to 
appropriate participation. The number and eligibility of 
the representative is to be determined by the type of body 
constituted. 
Reimbursement of expenses: the basic principles seem 
capable of being generalised beyond national boundaries. 
5. Requirements for the content of a right to a hearing in 
post-market control. 
If we are right in assuming that the idea that post-rnarket 
control represents the equivalent for the approval of a 
plant which constitutes an environmental risk, then there 
is nothing to contradict the transfer of basic principles 
concerning valid minimum standards developed f rom 
procedural law into the from of consumer participation in 
post-market control. Literally speaking, this could not 
occur since the areas of applicability are distinguished. 
It should be possible, however, to develop fundamental 
principles for procedure. It is therefore a worthwhile 
exercise to bear in mind the varying roles which consumer 
participation could play in post-market control: they 
could produce public awareness of negotiation processes 
which typically take place to the exclusion of third 
parties; but they could equally assume the role of taking 
the initiative for administrative control that would 
make the consumer the 'enforcer' of control authorities. 
Similarly, they could also open the way for consumers to 
construct their own information system enabling them to 
vent their grievances without engaging the authorities. 
176. The problem of protection of secrets seems to have 
no bearing on the standardisacion of consumer 
goods. Perhaps this is because technical standards 
for consume: goods only have to correspond with 
'generally applied technical rules' (Joerges et 
al., ?N ::_17, p. 147 et seq.J, and lag behind 
scientific developments. 
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In this sense, they would no longer be the 'enforcers', 
but the 'watch-dogs' of international, or at any rate, 
European movement of goods. However, consumers could only 
play an active role; if their rights and duties· were 
written down: if they had access to the information of the 
authorities, and when represented in the decision-making 
bodies 1770 that they could be given the opportunity to be heard. 
IV. Obstacles 
Procedure 
to the Extension of Participation in 
My concern here is not to map out the political 
perspectives of a right to health or a right to 
appropriate participation in procedure. The current 
discussion is more orientated towards a consideration of 
the difficulties inherent in consumer participation in 
standardisation and equally post-markec control. 
1. Based on the structure of European standardisation. 
CEN/CENELEC is the umbrella organization name for national 
standardisation bodies in the EC and EFTA countries. 
National standardisation bodies send representatives to 
the technical committees instituted by CEN/CENELEC. If 
consumers are to be able to take part in standa=disation 
at a national level, then delegated representatives ought 
likewise to be able to formulate a joint position through 
national bodies in relation to its f ield of activity. 
CEN/CENELEC fear a doubling of consumer participation 
which would be incompatible with the sketchy structure of 
European harmonisation. Nor, it would seem, is there any 
representation of industry groups at the mee:ings of the 
technical committees. In fact, the aim of this critique 
is to lay bare a structural weakness. This is because the 
secretariat for coordination, the current 'Organisation 
for European Consumer Participation', has a structural 
advantage over European industry in relation to all 
177. A synopsis of national reports on pcs:-sale in 
Member States, Australia and USA wi~l make it 
possible to give a firmer basis to the :equirements 
of participation, report for :.he Com:nissi::m, H-W. 
Micklitz (ed.), Nachmarktkontr:Jl::.e iiber 
Verbrauchsgüter ir. den ~itglieds:.aaten der EG, to 
be published in ZERP Schri=ter.rei~e. 
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deficiencies. Ideally, it is more suited to injecting a 
real European input into the standardisation process, a 
capacity which national industrial bodies are far from 
able to achieve. In other words, the proce~s of arriving 
at a consensus, which national industries must first bring 
about through technical committees, has already been 
achieved by the observers at the secretariat for 
coordination, when they take their places on committees. 
It nevertheless remains that no objection can be raised in 
principle against European consumer participation based on 
structural divergency. Increasingly, at European level, 
consumers are gaining ground in the process of political 
coordination, which national industries have been 
organi7~ng effectively for a considerable period of 
time. It is fair to say then that, theoretically, 
consumers go into negotiation with a consensual advantage. 
2. Based on the type of cinsumer participation. 
National bodies delegate technical experts to the 
CEN/CENELEC committees, which are often members of 
interested business concerns. Consumer participation in 
European standardisation is fed from preferred sources: 
(i) technical experts from relevant consumer advisory 
councils or consumer committees for national 
standardisation bodies; (ii) technical experts from 
national consumer and usually verification bodies; and 
(iii) independent experts from research organisations and 
laboratories etc.. The first group of technical experts 
~rom national consumer advisor~7 §odies is not integrated into consumer participation. The representatives of 
the second and third groups look upon it as unlikely 
consumer representatives, despite holding their expertise 
in good180steem, but fear creating 'fraternity of 
experts' amongst those responsible for drafting 
standards. One can therefore also accuse Eurooean 
standardisation of being politial rather than technlcal 
standardisation. The politicisation of standards through 
178. 
179. 
180. 
See W. 3rinkmann, Die Verbraucherorganisationen in 
~er BRD und ihre Tätigkeit bei der 
uberbetrieblichen technischen Normung, 1976 
Joerges et a:., op cit. FN 117, p. 414 et seq. 
F. Wacener, Der Öffentliche Dienst im Staat der 
Gegenwart, :n 'JVDStRL 37 (1979) p. 214 et seq., 
238. 
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consumers should therefore be seen ~~1 the true reason for CEN/CENELEC's policy of obstruction.• 
3. Based on internal structural defitiencies in the 
organisation of consumer policy. 
Alongside all the obstructions blocking the way to the 
development of efficient participation of third parties 
Member States, Commission, industry and standardisation 
bodies - the consumer bodies themselves create their own 
obstacles. Here one could mention above all the problems 
in relation to the organisation of coordination between 
the consumer advisory comrnittee and the four European 
consumer organisations. The present situation is that, in 
four years, the parties concerned have not managed to 
agree a clear organisational structure concerning the 
division of competences, with w~h]h they could launch an 
offensive against the Commission. The dual role of the 
secretariat between the Consumer Consultative Comrnittee 
(CCC) and European standardisation bodies weakens the 
position of consumers. There is no conception of how to 
purposively make use of the organisational advantage and 
tap the abundant resources of the national consumer 
bodies. This would require a systematically constructed 
system f~SJ recording and processing information for 
consumers. As long as these twofold di=ficulties are 
not thrashed out, European consumer ?articipation will in 
its present form continue to have to fight for its own 
survival. 
4. Based on the administrative practice of post-market 
control. 
We have seen that post-rnarket control, despite all the 
differencies in regulation, points to a common end - the 
'decision to control' is negotiated informally with the 
181. Moreover, which for their part could be promoted by 
industry. Paradoxically, dependency on the 
fleshpots of the Commission is accompanied by a 
growing independence of the industrial decision-
making :ramework. 
182. On ~he underlying q~ar=els, see Coerges et al., op 
cit. F:"I :17, p. 412 et seq. 
183. cf. ~y suggestion, ~ata bank on Product Safety, 
presented to the csordination secretar:at cn 9 
'.Jct::iber c986. 
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producer concerned and is never officially made public. 
Thus, the formal assurance of participation through the 
hearing procedure can only fall short. This does not make 
the demand for appropriate participation obsolete. Orily 
the question has to be raised, how the right to 
participation ought to be shaped in order not to allow 
participation to dry up despite its factual exclusion from 
formal decision-making. In this context, it is helpful to 
reiterate the varying forrns of participation in post-
market control. 
Consumers can only assurne the task of taking the 
initiative if they are in a position to compel 
authorities to take action against defects and make them 
account for their actions. Therefore procedural 
guarantees must be coupled with the right to a fair 
hearing. One could also infer the irnposition of 
constraints on the authorities to justify the adoption cf 
informal rneasures of control. The turning point and 
crucial point of procedural participation is 
understandably the producer's fear of having to accept 
damage to his reputation through adverse publicity. This 
is an argument of only limited validity because an 
enterprise can incorporate consurner com~ä~ints about 
unsafe products into a selfish rnarket model. 
European consumer organisations can only work as 'watch-
dogs' of the free trade of goods, if they build their own 
system for recording and processing information. Their 
participation in State post-market control mechanisms 
would more than anything have the function of feeding its 
own information system with the relevant data from the 
authorties. An important function could be taken over by 
the testing institutions, whose know-how has as yet not 
been put to use in the organisation of consumer 
participation. As a final remark, a certain degree of 
parallelism in post-market control between authorities and 
consumers would be desirable, as it would also be in 
relation to the standardisation process. 
184. For similar assessments of undertaki~gs in 
marketing, cf. Bruhn, Kc~sumente~zufrieden ~~d 
Beschwerden, Schriften zum Marketing, Band 41, 
1982. 
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